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BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit was brought by beneficiaries of the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust 
against the defendants, Trustees of the Marie Dorothy Wattis Trust , claiming 
damage for mismanagment of the Trust estate. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents, after a four day trial before the court sitting without a 
ju ry , were granted judgment against appellants John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault 
for the sum of $143,526.03; and judgment against Donald Bowman in the sum of 
$11,318.91. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants John Dussault and Dorothy Dussault seek reversal of the judg-
ment entered against them, Respondents seek affirmance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts set out in Respondents original brief is referred to 
and will not be here repeated. We do call the following matters to the CourtTs 
attention, these matters being set out in the Court's majority opinion, as Statements 
of Fact: 
1. "No complaint was made of this practice when the trust estate was being 
increased, but when the stock market went down and the loss occurred, 
the plaintiffs sued." 
The record was clear, and the court so found, that during the period 
of improper activities, no accountings were made by defendants to 
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anyone (Finding No. 7, R-193) . The record is also clear that 
during the period when gains were experienced, no accountings of 
any kind ever went to these beneficiaries. They were not consulted 
or informed in any way of the transactions, and had no opportunity 
to complain until the facts were learned. (R-1,7) . This was after 
the death of Mrs. Bowman, long after the damage had been done, and 
long after repeated requests for accountings had been refused or 
ignored by these defendants. (Ex. I, Ex. T ) . 
2. "As to the remaining part of the judgment, one must look to the language 
of the trust instrument to see if the Dussaults can be held for a diminu-
tion of the trust assets by reason of buying on margin and by dealing 
in speculative stocks.TT 
This statement correctly sets forth two of the grounds (margin and 
speculation) but ignores two others shown without dispute in the 
evidence and found by the Trial Court, namely, complete lack of 
diversification and complete lack of considering the interests of 
the other beneficiaries (RespondentsT Brief page 27, Findings 7,9, 
(R 193, 194). 
3. TT.. .they cannot be held responsible for losses due to a falling stock 
market." 
The losses here were due solely to the improper actions of defendants, 
and not to a falling stock market. The evidence as to market conditions, 
during this period when the losses were incurred was as follows 
(Tr 355-6): 
Q During the period from 1968 through 1970, this particular trust 
apparently incurred substantial losses. Is that what your recapitulation Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark L w School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
indicates, Mr. Jevens? 
A Yes, sir; it does. 
Q Could you tell the Court what the general market overall was during 
those years? 
A 1968 through 1970. 
Q Yes. 1968 through 1970. 
A 1968 was basically a year of rising prices in the stock market. 1969 
was a year of declining pr ices . The market actually picked up , as I r e -
call, in the late fall of 1968 or early 1969, based on most averages. 1970 
was a continuation of that decline up until May or June of that year at 
which time the market did turn around abruptly and rose substantially 
from the middle of 1970 to the end of that year . So that if you look at 
the example of Dow Jones average for 1970 it still showed, I think, up 
two percent as I recall and yet there were many stocks that went through 
a 24 or 30 percent price change during that year . 
Q Would there be anything in the overall picture of the market during 
those years that would have resulted in a general loss to trust invest-
ments as such during that period of time? 
A Taking the three years? 
Q Yes. 
A There are some measures of th is , I have a report with me, but 
basically, from the beginning of 1968 to the end of 1970 I think most 
accounts would have shown a marked improvement in overall value. 
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Q By most accounts, would we be talking about an account that was 




A TRUSTEE'S DUTIES ARE NOT CO-EXTENSIVE WITH 
HIS POWERS UNDER THE TRUST INSTRUMENT. 
Although the precise basis for the majority opinion is not clear to us , it 
seems to hold 
1) The Trust instrument prevails over the statute; 
2) Under the Trust instrument the Trustees had the power to purchase 
speculative stocks; 
3) Since they only did what they were authorized to do, they cannot be 
held liable. 
The result of this holding can be calamitous for unsuspecting trustors and bene-
ficiaries . For instance, a Trustee has the power to invest Trust funds in real 
estate. He invests the entire corpus, sight unseen, in Bolivian swamp land. 
The Trustee in doing so had no ulterior motive, realized no private gain, yet in 
one act destroyed the Trust . As we read the current decision, he would have 
no liability. 
We submit this Court has erroneously equated power with duty. It is 
universally held that even though the Trustee be vested with broad, even un-
controlled and absolute discretions and powers, he still must act in a reason-
ably prudent manner to effect the purpose of the Trust . 
78 ALR 2nd 41: "Frequently a will or other trust instrument gives the 
trustee a discretion to invest in nonlegals, and does not expressly impose Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
invest. Nevertheless, it is well settled that the law imposes certain 
duties and obligations upon a trustee who has a general discretion as 
to investments, the result of which is to make many types of invest-
ments improper even under a power to invest in nonlegals. 
A trustee who is given a discretion to invest in nonlegals does not 
have an arbitrary and unlimited discretion as to the investments he will 
make." 
78 ALR 2nd 42: "The granting of a discretion to invest in nonlegals does 
not affect the application of the general rule that a t rustee, in making 
investments, must exercise the proper degree of care , prudence, diligence, 
and caution." 
78 ALR 2nd 42: "The grant of authority to invest in nonlegals does not 
authorize a trustee to use any less care and caution in the selection of 
investments, but merely gives him a wider field in which to exercise 
due care and caution. Re Jeffress* Will (1950) 198 Misc 249, 97 NYS 2nd 
132: Re FreeTs Will (1956) 4 Misc 2nd 463, 148 NYS 2nd 884; Re 
BerthetTs Estate (1959) 22 Misc 2nd 7, 196 NYS 2nd 354." 
78 ALR 2nd 44: "There is a serious question whether a trust instrument 
which purports to give a trustee an "absolute and uncontrolled discretion" 
as to investments will give the trustee any broader authority than an 
instrument which gives him a "general discretion" as to investments." 
Alexander v Hicks, Ky 1972, 488 SW2 336: "However, a discretion 
which, though purportedly unlimited in other respects , can be exercised 
only for the benefit of other persons does not in itself invalidate a trust . 
54 Am Jur 48 (Trusts , §36). Not only is the Trusteed power limited 
with respect to the purposes and beneficiaries of the t rus t , it is limited 
also by the duties imposed on all Trustees , such as good faith, diligence, 
and the l ike." 
Judge v Kortenhaus, N . J . 1963, 192 A2 320: "Professor Scott in his 
notable work on trusts sets forth the general rule applicable to discretionary 
powers conferred upon Trustees as follows: 
"To the extent to which the Trustee has discretion, the court will 
not control his exercise of it so long as he does not exceed the limits 
of the discretion conferred upon him. The court will not substitute its 
own judgment for h is . Even where the trustee has discretion, however, 
the court will not permit him to abuse the discretion. This ordinarily 
means that as long as he acts not only in good faith and from proper 
motives, but also within the bounds of a reasonable judgment, the court 
will not interfere; but the court will interfere when he acts outside the 
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bounds of a reasonable judgment. . ." 2 Scott on Trus ts , (2nd Ed. 1956), 
§187, p . 1374." 
In Re Estate of Becker, Wis. 1972, 202NW2 681: "In this case the respond-
ents seek the appellants removal as Trustees and an accounting therein for 
damages sustained to the Trust because of appellantsT said actions. The 
basis for this action rests on the rule that a Trustee still has a strict duty 
of loyalty to the trust even though the will or trust instrument gives the 
Trustee broad power of discretion. These powers must still be exercised 
according to the law and consistent with the duties and obligations as a 
trustee of the Trus t . " 
Briggs v Crowley, Mass. 1967, 224NE2 417: "It is well established that 
"even very broad discretionary powers are to be exercised in accordance 
with fiduciary standards and with reasonable regard for usual fiduciary 
principles ." Old Colony Trust Co. v . Silliman, Mass, 223NE2 504. In 
Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v . Stone, 348 Mass 345, 351, fn. 8, 
203 NE2 547, 552, we stated that "A fair reading of the whole of most 
trust instruments will reveal a judicially enforceable, external, and 
ascertainable standard for the exercise of even broadly expressed fiduciary 
powers. See United States v Powell, 307 F2 821, 826, (10th C i r ) . " In 
the instant case the trust instrument itself contains a clear expression 
of the applicable standard for the exercise of the trustees1 discretion. 
"The principal purpose of this trust is to provide for the necessaries 
and comfort of the persons named herein and in order to accomplish 
this purpose it is intended to give said Trustees the fullest authority 
and discretion." (emphasis supplied). The essence of the petitioners 
petition is that the respondents have not exercised their discretion in 
accordance with this s tandard." (decree sustaining demurrer to petition 
reversed) 
Dombey v Rindfoos, Ohio 1958, 151NE2 563: "The actions of fiduciaries 
of a trust estate will not be upheld in a course palpably arbitrary and 
unreasonable. "It is not sufficient that he be honest, and from a strictly 
moral standpoint act in good faith. He is bound in law to exercise diligence 
and to act reasonably." Kroeller v Poland, 80 Ohio St. 418, 89 NE 100, 
Morris v Mull, 110 Ohio St. 623, 634, 635, 144 NE 436, 39ALR323, 
Restatement of Trus ts , 431, Section 170. 
It is our view that the seemingly unlimited discretion contended 
for by the language authorizing the trustees to act as if one were "absolute 
owners of the Trust Estate" and to exercise "privileges and discretions" 
which the testator would exercise if present , cannot mean more than that 
the decedent intended that the fiduciaries would act reasonably, as 
required by law, and for the best interest of the trust estate. 
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Fiduciaries will not be excused on the ground that the instrument creating 
the trust and making them Trustees has given them broad authority 
and unlimited discretion in the administration of the Trust . 
The Trustee cannot take advantage of liberal provisions of a Trust 
instrument to relieve him from the legal responsibility of a fiduciary 
under the law." 
Davis v Duke University, NC 1973, 194SE2 761: "The extent of the discretion 
lodged in Trustees by settlors may be enlarged by the use of adjectives 
or phrases such as "absolute" or "uncontrolled". Even the use of such 
strong terms does not grant unlimited discretion. The real question is 
whether it appears that the trustees are exercising their discretionary 
powers in the manner in which the settlor contemplated they should act." 
This "powers and duties" concept is clearly shown in Title 33 of our Code, 
Investments by Fiduciaries. 3 3 - 2 - 1 . U.C.A. 1953, is one paragraph, consisting 
of two sentences. The first sentence outlines the duties of a fiduciary, i . e . , the 
"prudent man" ru le . The second sentence specifies acceptable properties and 
investments, within the limitations of the foregoing standard (prudent man). 
33-2-2, U.C .A. 1953, apparently is relied upon in our case to find that the 
trust instrument itself is paramount over the statute, and does away with the prudent 
man ru le . There are two problems with this- first, the statute provides 
a minimum standard of conduct. Thus , a Trustee under strict limitations of power 
in the Trust instrument could not rely upon the statute to provide those powers 
(although the court could do so under 33-2-3) . Secondly, the Marie Dorothy 
Wattis Trust nowhere purports to define the duties of the Trustee as other than 
duties the law imposes. It does grant broad discretionary powers- just as in the 
cited cases- but never does it state the Trustees will not be required to act as 
Trustees. 
-10-
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The express purpose of the Trust (R-3) is: 
. . , "for the purposes of management of her property and estate 
with greater personal ease and freedom during her lifetime and 
conservation of the same for final distribution after her death. . ." 
Article VIII, relied upon in the CourtTs decision as determinative of his 
case, begins (R-7): 
TTTo carry out the express purposes of this t rus t , and in aid of its 
proper execution and the administration, management, and disposition 
of the trust estate, the Trustees are vested with the following powers 
and discretions: " (emphasis added) 
POINT TWO 
THE TRUST INSTRUMENT DID NOT ABSOLVE THE DEFENDANTS FROM 
LIABILITY. 
The majority opinion seized upon a few words in the powers and duties 
Article of the trust to in effect hold the defendants could not be held liable for 
losses. 
(a) Exculpatory provisions are always strictly construed, see dissent 
of Justice Maughan, Restatement of Trus ts , Second, §222. 
(b) The language of Article VIII does not, unless taken out of context, 
insulate the Trustees from liability. The language relied on by the 
majority opinion protects third persons dealing with the trust in good 
faith, and protects the Trustees from liability (for instance, assessments 
or stolen stock certificates) arising from ownership of securities. 
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of a trust instrument attempting to 
relieve the trustee from liability for breach of t rus t , he is liable for 
breaches of trust committed in bad faith, intentional breaches, and 
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breaches committed with reckless indifference to the rights of the 
beneficiaries. Restatement of Trusts Second, §222 (2). Such a 
provision would be contrary to public policy and void. 
(d) The Trial Court findings cited and not reversed by the opinion 
of this court, included, 
1) Dussaults managed the trust for their own benefit, with no regard 
to other beneficiaries and made no accountings; 
2) They were guilty of gross inattentiveness, equivalent of bad faith; 
3) During this time Dussault was a knowledgeable investor, and 
knew he was not allowed to manage a trust this way, yet did it anyway 
because it was in his own best interest; 
4) Speculated to a high degree with trust funds, improperly 
investing the funds in speculative stocks, without diversifying 
and compounded his faults by extensive use of margins. 
CONCLUSION 
While he may, under different trust instruments, have different standards 
to adhere to, we come to the basic question that a man is either a trustee or he is not. 
If he i s , he must act as such. If he does not have these fiduciary duties and 
loyalties, he may be a bailee, an agent, or some other entity, but certainly he is 
not a t rustee. This concept is reflected in Rippey v Denver United States National 
Bank, 273 F . Supp. 718, Colo 1967: 
-12-
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"The obligation of the trustee to exercise prudence is a species of 
his duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries. He owes his allegiance to the 
beneficiaries first. Other considerations are secondary. The accepted 
standard is declared in the famous opinion of the late Mr. Justice (then 
Judge) Cardozo in Meinhard v Salmon, 249N.Y458, 1 164 N.E. 545, 62 ALR 
1 (1928): 
"Many forms of conduct permissible in a workday world for those 
acting at arm fs length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary t ies. 
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. 
Not honesty alone, but the punctillio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition 
that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the 
attitude of the courts or equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of 
undivided loyalty by the disintegrat ing erosion1 of particular exceptions. 
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level 
higher than that trodden by the crowd.TT 
We submit if Bowman is not reconsidered, Utah will be the only state of 
the Union where a Trustee may, with impunity, use margin, speculate, and thus 
destroy the estate he is entrusted with. The petition for rehearing should be 
granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
H. DON SHARP 
550 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Petitioners 
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